Parlem però de la part que dedica als catalans i a Catalunya, el nostre amic anglès fa un recull intensiu de tot l’argumentari de l’espanyolisme recalcitrant, això si amb suposada asèpsia acadèmica, però amb moments brillants de la literatura històrica, en el seu apartat “The Hot Topic of Catalan Independence” té moments de glòria “Tensions between Catalonia and the rest of Spain have existed for centuries. At the risk of oversimplification, a potted history of Catalonia goes something like this.” i ja ens adverteix que està corrent el risc de simplicar, agraim l’advertiment però només és necessari anar un parell de línies més a baix per descobrir que fa alguna cosa més que simplificar, beu directament de les fonts del nacionalisme espanyol “Catalonia was never a kingdom or an independent state” (Catalunya mai va ser un regne o un estat independent), cançó repetida per tots aquells que desconeixen la història medieval europea i la definició d’estat.
Però a part de negar l’existència de Catalunya, el nostre autor en la seva “oversimplification” ens regala una nova versió de la guerra de successió “The Decree of Nueva Planta abolished the Generalitat and ended self-rule. The Catalan language was also discouraged.” (El Decret de Nova Planta va abolir la Generalitat i va acabar autogovern. L’idioma català també es va desencoratjar), curiós no?, l’experiodista britànic convertit en investigador espanyol, fa una incursió històrica i ens explica que la llengua catalana va caure en depressió. No va passar res, va ser una recaiguda psicològica col·lectiva, a la qual la repressió militar espanyola sota les ordres dels borbons no va existir.
Ja en tenim dues, Catalunya no ha existit mai, la llengua catalana es va deprimir tota sola, que més podem trobar en les cinc pàgines dedicades a Catalunya? No continuaré, us deixo el text, llegiu si teniu ganes i descobriu la veritable història de les relacions catalano-hispanes dels últims mil anys, però abans deixeu-me que us reprodueixi el paràgraf final:
“The Catalan problem isto some extent a story of shared political failure, with most of the responsibility falling on the Catalan government, and needs to be resolved politically and not through coercion. There is too much common history between Catalonia and the rest of Spain to establish a frontier between the two.” Està clar, el nostre problema és la història d’un fracàs polític, però els responsables som nosaltres mateixos i les nostres institucions, segons el raonament lògic d’aquest britànic al servei de sa majestat borbònica.
És indiscutible que existeix la llibertat d’escriure i opinar el que es vol, no serem nosaltres a dir el contrari, el contrari ho diuen les lleis espanyoles que limitem greument aquesta llibertat en tants aspectes, però vist que són diners públics, també nostres per tant, i el llibre està fent en anglès per provar a desinformar el màxim possible els lectors internacionals, cal tenir clar que aquest Real Instituto Elcano està presidit honoríficament per Felip de Borbó, amb Felipe González, José María Aznar i José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero entre els patrons, per tant és un organisme més de l’aparell de l’estat espanyol que treballa intensament contra Catalunya, cal no oblidar-ho.
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The Hot Topic of Catalan Independence
The government of Catalonia, a dynamic region (see Figure 2.9) with more inhabitants (7.4 million) than Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg and a territory roughly the size of Switzerland, is locked in a struggle with the central government in Madrid to set up its own state and secede from Spain. Defusing the independence movement is one of the most complex challenges facing the country. Figure 2.9. Catalonia at a Glance Catalonia Population 7.4 million (16% of the total) GDP 19%, making it Spain’s economic powerhouse Manufacturing Around one quarter of the total Exports Close to 25% of the total Tourism The region attracts the largest number of tourists Source: Government of Catalonia.
Tensions between Catalonia and the rest of Spain have existed for centuries. At the risk of oversimplification, a potted history of Catalonia goes something like this. The County of Barcelona and the Kingdom of Aragon to the east and south were brought together through a dynastic union in 1137. The two realms maintained their own institutions and laws and were ruled separately. The composite state was known as the Crown of Aragon. Catalonia was never a kingdom or an independent state. The Generalitat (government) of Catalonia was established in 1359, with a president and what is considered one of Europe’s earliest parliaments. King Ferdinand of Aragon married Queen Isabella of Castile in 1469, uniting the two crowns. Catalonia retained considerable self-rule, with its own political institutions, courts and laws. A key event was the War of the Spanish Succession. After King Charles II ‘the Bewitched’ died childless in 1700, the crown passed to his chosen heir Philippe, Duke of Anjou, of the French House of Bourbon, who became Felipe V. Catalans, fearful of the consequences of a French king, plotted against Felipe and allied themselves with England, Holland and the Austrian empire, who opposed the Bourbon rule over Spain. Abandoned by its allies, following the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht (which ceded Gibraltar to Great Britain), Catalonia continued to fight but fell after the 14-month siege of Barcelona. The Decree of Nueva Planta abolished the Generalitat and ended self-rule. The Catalan language was also discouraged. In 1931, Francesc Macià proclaimed a Republic of Catalonia, which was short-lived but led to the return of the Generalitat as a concession from Madrid. After the 1936-39 Civil War, the victorious General Franco had Lluís Companys, President of the Catalan government, executed in 1940. He was arrested in France by the Gestapo and extradited to Spain. Over the next 35 years, Catalan identity and language were severely repressed, and all political institutions abolished. Following Franco’s death in 1975 and the transition to democracy, the Generalitat was re-established and varying degrees of autonomy were also granted for the rest of Spain’s regions in a process known as ‘café para todos’ (coffee for all).
Nationalists have twisted Catalonia’s history into a narrative of victimismo (persecution), fomented by the Generalitat and its allies in a top-down movement to catalanise society through education, linguistic immersion and even sports policies that are perceived by unionists as anti-Spanish. This distorted view of history ignores among other things the significant influence of the Catalan bourgeoisie on the main lines of Spanish economic policy. On the language front, all classes in schools are taught in Catalan (Spanish is taught as a separate subject). The Catalan government opposed the Supreme Court ruling that those parents who wanted their children to be taught in Castilian have that right, as it is the common language of Spain, and postponed its implementation through legal manoeuvres. The Court ordered that 25% of instruction should be given in Spanish when the student or parents asked. It should be noted, however, that very few parents demanded this right; unionist politicians, particularly the Popular Party and Ciudadanos, said parents were scared of asking for tuition in Spanish.
Tensions with Madrid came to a head in 2010 when the Constitutional Court struck down some of the articles of the region’s new self-government charter including recognition of Catalan as the ‘preferred language’ after the Popular Party referred it to the court. Three-quarters of Catalan voters had approved the charter in a referendum, following its approval by the Catalan and national parliaments, against 21% who rejected it. The abstention rate, however, was high at 51%. Ernest Benach, the President of the Catalan parliament, claimed the court’s ruling opened a ‘crisis of state’ because it ‘ignores the will of Catalan citizens’.
The court’s verdict marked a turning point as it convinced nationalists, including Jordi Pujol, President of the region’s government from 1980 to 2003 and the preeminent nationalist leader, that Catalonia no longer belonged inside Spain. Pujol became a discredited figure after he admitted publicly in 2014 that he had offshore bank accounts with a considerable amount of money in Andorra, which he claimed was left to him by his father. He was stripped of his honorary privileges. Pujol and his wife Marta Ferrusola were subpoenaed to testify before a court in February 2016 in connection with a probe into money-laundering. They denied that the money came from corrupt activities during his 23 years as Catalonia’s regional Prime Minister. Several of their children were also under investigation.
Spain’s economic crisis intensified the push for independence and led to an illegal non-binding referendum in November 2014 after the Spanish parliament rejected the Catalan parliament’s request (299 votes to 47) and in defiance of the Constitutional Court. Catalan nationalists blamed the central government for the region’s severe spending cuts, and demanded a new fiscal pact as they were aggrieved at transferring under the regional financing system of ‘solidarity’ what they regarded as a disproportionate share of their wealth to Madrid for distribution to the poorer regions. Pro-independence economists say Catalonia would claw back the equivalent of 8% of its GDP if it did not have to hand over its taxes to the national government. The prevalence of toll roads in Catalonia also fuelled a sense of grievance among Catalans, who say this shows the national government has failed to invest enough in the region’s infrastructure. Toll roads account for more than half the length of national highways running through Catalonia, more than twice the national average. The Generalitat oversees some toll roads, and most of the payments go to the Catalan company, Abertis.
Of the 2.3 million people who voted in the mock referendum (out of 6.3 million who were eligible), more than 80% were in favour of independence (29% of the possible votes). Artur Mas, the President of Catalonia and leader of the centre-right Convergence and Union (CiU) alliance, hailed the result as a victory and opponents said it was a failure. Mas followed this with a snap election in September 2015 billed as a de facto vote on secession which was won by a pro-independence movement called Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes), an unholy alliance between Mas’s Democratic Convergence party (the more moderate and smaller Democratic Union of Josep Antoni Durán i Lleida, the other party in the CiU, had by then broken away in a disagreement over independence), the much more radical Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and grass-roots separatists.
Junts pel Sí won 62 of the 135 seats in the Catalan parliament which, together with the 10 seats of the far left, anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), gave the pro-independence camp (an even more unholy alliance) 72 seats and 48% of the vote against 52% for parties opposed to independence. Junts pel Sí claimed the results of the September election gave the proindependence bloc the authority break away from Spain8 . Less than half of the votes was far from a clear mandate, as defined by constitutional experts. The Catalan parliament adopted a resolution calling for the creation of a breakaway republic over the course of 18 months and declared that decisions taken by the Spanish state –including rulings by the Constitutional Court– were no longer valid within the region. The Court quickly struck down the resolution.
The bloc subsequently fractured: CUP repeatedly refused over the course of three months to back the incumbent Mas ahead of the deadline to form a new government. CUP viewed Mas as too business-friendly, and he was also damaged by a string of corruption scandals, particularly that of Pujol (Mas was his political heir). In a last minute deal to avert fresh regional elections in March 2016 (which would have been the fourth in five years), Mas stepped down on 9 January in favour of Carles Puigdemont, the Convergence mayor of Girona and an ardent defender of secession from Spain.
The Spanish constitution gives the central government ‘exclusive competence’ on the authorisation of referendums; it is highly unlikely that one will be granted, whatever the political colour of the government. Allowing a referendum would run the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of competing demands for plebiscites in other regions, most notably the Basque Country, which along with Galicia is the other ‘historic’ region of nationalism, and would not go down well in the European Commission which does not want a fragmented EU. The only way to trigger a process that resulted in the independence of any region is through a constitutional amendment, which requires a large majority in the Spanish parliament, new elections and approval in a referendum held throughout the country.
Opinion polls showed that a significant proportion of Catalans –more than those in favour of the options of independence or maintaining the current situation– favoured a so-called ‘third way’ under which Catalonia would remain part of Spain, but with new powers and special treatment in recognition of the region’s ‘unique’ status (the so-called hecho diferencial). This possibility could be offered by modifying the regional government architecture as part of an overhaul of the Spanish Constitution which would then be put to a referendum in the whole of Spain, and if approved in Catalonia could be taken to mean that the region rejects independence. Only Podemos, among the four main parties, is in favour of a referendum on Catalan secession.
Dire warnings of the economic consequences of independence by business and bank leaders as Catalonia would no longer form part of the euro zone, the EU and of international institutions fell on deaf ears in the independence camp, but as time passes could well be taken more seriously as the impact sinks in, particularly among those who do not form the hard core of secessionists (estimated at 25% of Catalans). Luis Linde, the Governor of the Bank of Spain, warned that without the backing of the European Central Bank, capital controls on Catalan bank deposits could follow, while some Catalan companies began to re-locate outside the region.
Support for independence was strongest among young Catalans, according to a 2015 poll by the Catalan CEO institute. Asked whether they wanted the region to be independent, 50% of the total respondents said No and 43% said Yes. Of those aged 65 and above, close to 60% said they were against independence and 34% in favour. Among Catalans aged 18 to 24, 56% supported independence and 39% were against it. One factor behind the greater support among the young for independence is the Catalan education system, where instruction is given mainly in Catalan and which teaches an idiosyncratic version of Spanish and Catalan history, according to some notable historians. Also, young adults have less to lose than their parents or grandparents, many of whom moved to Catalonia from other regions and are more identified with Spain.
The previous Popular Party government challenged the independence movement at every step. Mas was called to court for his role in staging the mock referendum and accused of disobedience, abuse of power and embezzlement of public funds. The Constitution has two articles that could be wielded in extremis: Article 116 allows the national government to declare states of alarm, emergency and siege in a disobedient region and Article 155 to take coercive measures, following approval by an absolute majority in the Senate.
The Catalan problem is to some extent a story of shared political failure, with most of the responsibility falling on the Catalan government, and needs to be resolved politically and not through coercion. There is too much common history between Catalonia and the rest of Spain to establish a frontier between the two.
